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Introduction
In Culture in Chaos, Stephen Lubkemann suggests that most studies dealing with the 'condition of war' are split into two camps. 1 Either they emphasize how violence is organized or how warscape inhabitants -the anonymous heroes of 'ordinary' men and women -handle this violence. 2 'Warscape', a concept originally proposed by Carolyn
Nordstrom, are landscapes characterized by brutal violence, political volatility, physical insecurity and the disruptions and instabilities that exist in many civil war zones that different social actors navigate through. 3 Warscapes are the site of a 'complex and multidimensional agenda of social struggles (…) and life projects' that take form in a context in which 'the certainty of uncertainty has become a fundamental reality in the lives of social actors'. 4 Lubkeman emphasizes that while violence punctuates the lives of warscape inhabitants, it does not continuously script it. Thus, war is not a matter of 'all terror all the time'. 5 In their 1995 publication Fieldwork under fire, Antonius Robben and Carolyn
Nordstrom set out a research agenda to study 'the everyday experiences of people who are victims and perpetrators of violence. 6 Nordstrom reminds us that 'individuals do not make up a generic group of "combatants", "civilians", and "casualties" but an endlessly complex set of people and personalities, each of whom has a unique relationship to the war and a unique story to tell'. 7 At the same time, she suggests, these actors construct 'social order out of chaos'. 8 Lubkemann adds that 'the effects of violence [are] often contradictory, imposing new constraints while providing means for extending agency'. 9 Inhabiting a warscape is thus not merely a matter of coping with violence, but is deeply entrenched in 'the pursuit of a complex and multi-dimensional agenda of social struggles, 4 interpersonal negotiations and life projects'. 10 It is therefore difficult to draw a clear line between the social conditions of war versus those of non-war as social actors continue to struggle throughout both conditions in a peace-to war continuum. 11 While we subscribe to Lubkemann's argument above that war is not a matter of 'all terror all the time', we suggest a further qualification: war is not a matter of 'all terror all the time' all over the place. 12 In other words, we propose an understanding of warscape that explicitly deals with its inherent geography. We posit that warscapes are not per se 'socially unstable places', but differentiated arenas, networks and connections of relational spaces in which distinct human trajectories co-exist. 13 As social spaces warscapes are always under construction in the sense Doreen Massey alludes to: 'the real import of spatiality is the possibility of multiple narratives.' 14 Indeed, violent conflict can be a threat or an opportunity for those immediately concerned, often at the same time.
Whether violence is threatening or offers opportunities depends, however, on the specific spatial and temporal configuration of power, authority and economic flows, which open certain trajectories while foreclosing others. 15 These trajectories may vary in different places and at different times in a given warscape. In other words: violence has ambiguous, often contradictory effects on agency at different times, in different places and for different individuals.
In this paper, we develop a heuristic approach for the study and interpretation of the geography of warscapes. The proposed heuristics are informed by our own fieldwork in conflict ridden parts of Sri Lanka, Guinea and Ethiopia. Our objective is a theoretically informed understanding of warscape inhabitants' strategies in contexts of multi-scalar, highly contested and spatially differentiated systems of authority and power. For this 5 purpose we combine two arguments that have so far been discussed separately; Michel de Certeau's distinction between tactics and strategies and its adoption in the study of warscapes by political anthropologists on the one hand, and geographer Michael Watts' work on governable spaces on the other hand. We argue that, in combination, the concepts of 'social navigation', 'governable spaces' and 'governable orders' are particularly well suited to scrutinize warscapes in which violent competition over authority creates multiple trajectories of threat and opportunity and makes these highly malleable in space and time. Our heuristic framework provides a starting point for understanding the spatial dimensions of war, which we consider both as a 'violent condition' and a 'social condition'. 16 The article is divided into three sections. The following section critically reviews and (partly) reformulates the concepts that are at the core of our framework. Subsequently, two empirical vignettes from the Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka civil war illustrate the usefulness of our proposed heuristics in understanding the geography of warscape. Using own field material and other authors' ethnographies enables us to demonstrate the significance of these concepts in different settings. Finally, we conclude by drawing attention to the inherently geographic nature of protracted violent conflict and the agency of warscape inhabitants. 'the goal is not to make clearer how the violence of order is transmuted into a disciplinary technology, but rather to bring to light the clandestine forms taken by the dispersed, tactical, and make-shift creativity of groups or individuals already caught in the nets of "discipline". Pushed to their ideal limits, these procedures and ruses of consumers compose the network of an antidiscipline which is the subject of this book'.
Understanding the geography of warscape
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De Certeau strongly rejects the passivity and determinism, which he discerns and criticizes in Pierre Bourdieu's conception of the social actor. While the latter insists on the socially stratified character of cultural practices, de Certeau views cultural practices as largely gratuitous, a means of circumventing power rather than bidding for it. 19 Analytically, de Certeau's distinction between tactics and strategies is problematic, though, as it bears the danger of reproducing a dichotomy between domination and resistance that appear fixed in space and time. Massey rightly criticizes that de Certeau conceives of power in society as a monolithic order, which the tactics of the weak try to circumvent. 20 Massey underlines that the coherence of 'the powerful' should not be overestimated and neither should the potential power of 'the weak' be minimized. She goes on to argue that de Certeau implicitly assimilates strategy with 'place' while tactics depend on 'time'. In this reading, space appears as fixed, while time allows dynamism.
Tactics allow navigating around the powers of place in order to come by over time. 25 This kind of reasoning falls prey to the same criticism that Massey levelled against de Certeau; ethnographies that employ de Certeau's tactics/strategies distinction tend to 'romanticize' tactics as the 'weapons of the weak' who manage to cleverly navigate across and between conflict lines and actors characteristic of warscapes.
Henrik Vigh has criticized this dichotomization of powerful and weak in the warscape literature: 'seeing strategy as acts of the powerful and tactics as acts of the weak disregards the fact that a terrain is an intrinsically multilayered phenomenon containing a multitude of negotiations of power'. 26 Vigh proposes the concept of 'social navigation' that 'is able to encompass "instability" and movement in our understanding of action while building on an awareness of both individual will and social forces'. 27 Two aspects are central in Vigh's conceptualisation of social navigation. First, it underlines how actors concomitantly steer through their immediate and imagined lifeworld, both in relation to their current placing within a given order and to their imagined future placing. Second, the navigation metaphor grasps how actors behave in relation to other actors, to a given 9 predominant social order, and to intricate interactions between actors, events and the shifting constellations of these social orders. Social navigation in short 'is praxis as motion within motion'. 28 Navigating in perilous and life-threatening warscapes demands actors to redraw trajectories, strategies and tactics of agency. With increasing navigation experience, these tactics and strategies also become ingrained in specific everyday praxis.
Governable space(s) and governable order(s)
Social navigation is, however, always situated in particular relations of domination and this is where we find Watts' writings on 'governable spaces' useful as it adds the more structural dimension of social order to the question of social navigation and agency. 29 Watts' concept of 'governable space' is inspired by Nikolas Rose's discussion of the spatial dimension of government and authority in Michel Foucault's writings. 30 Rose defines governable space(s) as the 'modalities in which a real and material governable world is composed, terraformed, and populated'. 31 Watts further operationalizes the idea of a governable space, which, in his interpretation, 'necessitate[s] the territorializing of governmental thought and practice', in short it is a 'political thought territorialized'. 32 In
Watts' reading, governable spaces expand and contract as the result of particular relations of domination that transcend formal spatial categories of the container type. Watts highlights the multiple, dynamic and interrelated forms of real-life power that co-exist at the same time. His account of governable spaces in Nigeria 'reveals ragged, unstable, perhaps ungovernable, spaces and analytics of government that hardly correspond to the well-oiled machine of disciplinary and biopower' that some of the Foucauldian derived analysis suggests. 33 While we concur with Watts' analysis of ragged, unstable spaces, we want to suggest that his conceptualization warrants further scrutiny of the inherent spatialities of governable spaces. Watts analyses social conditions and institutional logics as 'social spaces' rather than as the geography of violence. His usage of 'governable space(s)' in the Niger Delta conceptualises interrelated systems of power ('space of chieftaincy', 'space of indigeneity', 'space of nationalism') in terms of their simultaneous production, but labels and describes them largely independently in three separate sections that do not elaborate the intricate and convoluted connections between these spaces and their malleability in space and over time. 34 Indeed, our endeavour is to understand the configuration, the entanglement and interplay of these multiple 'governable spaces' in a
given locality and at a given time, i.e. their specific spatialities, as rationales of rule territorialized.
While a social figuration transcends a given locality, the in situ practices of actors do not. We therefore suggest the notion of governable order, which is closer to Foucault's understanding of governmentality, to grasp the rationale of a system of authority. 35 To distinguish the analytics of governable order and governable space, we define a governable order as a non-territorial, social figuration of power, norms and rules that transcends spatial scales and whose working hinges on multiple spatial connections, both material and non-material. Governable orders sediment into a specific hierarchy of rules and authoritative powers, varying at different moments in time in a given place and in different places at the same moment in time. Such reading of governable space as an amalgam of multiple, overlapping governable orders resonates with Massey's concept of space as ongoing production. 36 In our heuristics, the concept governable order denotes 11 the social figuration of a system of power, norms and rules -i.e. the rationale of an order, while governable space describes the spatial configuration of different overlapping governable orders in a specific place and time, i.e. how these orders and their rationales become effective in a particular social condition, place and time. 37 In other words, governable spaces are territorialized regimes of co-existing governable orders and neither stable nor rigid. We think that this differentiation is useful to better grasp the dynamics of 'ragged, unstable, perhaps ungovernable spaces' that are a defining feature of warscapes. 38 This is where Vigh's navigation metaphor links up with the logic of governable spaces: warscape inhabitants, faced with the ragged, unstable dynamics of multiple systems of authority, navigate through the perilous terrain of a given power topography and at the same time contribute to its re-shaping.
At a given time, different governable orders co-exist at a particular place, each with different sources of normativity, legitimation and coercion (e.g. the state's order, the order imposed by security forces, the order coercively implemented by rebels or combatants, etc.). These governable orders are not equally formative as they create different moments of inclusion and exclusion of different groups and individuals. The realm of power of each of these orders depends on the degree of their legitimisation in everyday life, the relative political and coercive power of its representatives and their reproduction through social practices. These governable orders exert influence in particular places and moments and with varying specifications for different actors. They thereby act as nodal points of historically and spatially superimposed layers of political authority. Although often oppressive in the context of warscapes, governable orders may be considered as legitimate by certain segments of the population. As the accumulative outcome of actor strategies and social practices, governable orders are highly sociable, relational and subject to transformation over time.
Empirical vignettes: Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka
We demonstrate the expediency of these three interrelated concepts by applying them to illustrates the short-term dynamics of governable orders over space and time and how these dynamics produce highly volatile, but relatively stable governable spaces. We use these two empirical vignettes mostly for illustrative purposes: The empirical illustrations are not meant to provide a comprehensive account of either of the two warscapes, nor do we claim that these two short vignettes exhaust the empirical field that can be analysed with our suggested heuristics.
South-eastern Sierra Leone, ca. 1991-1996
In Sierra Leone's civil war, the geography of warscape was most visible in the shifting spatial figurations surrounding the bush camps of the rebel RUF. At the early stages of the civil war between 1991 and 1996, the RUF operated from these bush camps where it also trained and 'ideologized' its cadres and recruits. 39 The camps were concentrated in the southeast of Sierra Leone and became spaces of RUF's internal militarization. The bush based fighting was accompanied by the kidnapping of young men and women into sexual, domestic or military servitude. At the same time, the camps attracted civilians who were not considered as RUF recruits, but provided services to the rebels, their wives, husbands and children. The camps' social order was based on strong social and genealogical bonds, which made the distinction between combatant and non-combatant inhabitants highly malleable. Women, for example, could be part of the RUF cadre, become victims of sexual harassment or work successfully in the service sectorsometimes they would experience all of these at the same time. The forests surrounding the bush camps were marked by their own distinctive governable space: while these territories provided some kind of protection against harassment from government troops, they were confined to a regime of intimidation and expropriation that the RUF imposed on the camp inhabitants, which made it difficult to escape from either the camps or the surrounding bush. 40 But the governable space of the bush camps turned into turmoil when governmental forces started to successfully attack the bush camps after 1996 and penetrated the surrounding territories. The camps and the bush became spaces of risk and uncertainty.
Community organized hunter defence troops, the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) or kamajor, scoured the forests. They had been recruited by the government as vigilantes who were more familiar with the forest terrain than regular governmental troops. 41 As a result of these military manoeuvres, a new governable order of violence, intimidation and expropriation emerged that made life for the forest inhabitants very troublesome. Had they accustomed themselves to the governable space that the RUF's bush camp presence had created and enjoyed relative protection from government troops, living in vicinity to RUF bush camps exposed them to risk and increased their vulnerability. The intrusion of the CDF fighters, and thereafter, of government troops into formerly rebel controlled territories created a much more ambivalent situation, resulting in the presence of different belligerent groups, each imposing its own governable order that shifted with their presence and absence in a particular place and time.
Non-combatants and other camp inhabitants who were not RUF cadres left the area in large numbers as they attempted to cut off their ties with the rebels in order to avoid harassment from CDF and government troops. This unsettled the fragile social coexistence that had emerged in the governable space of the camps and the bush prior to the government attacks. Steven Archibal and Paul Richards have argued that in the initial period of the war, the RUF was an insurgent group without strictly authoritarian rules and functioning. Cohesion was maintained through multiple social, ideological and economic bonds and obligations between RUF cadres and the amalgam of camp and nearby bush inhabitants. When the CDF and governmental forces penetrated their territory, RUF's internal unity was destabilized and the organization disintegrated into different factions.
Commanders and the rank and file acted increasingly independently from their superiors, plundering, looting and killing the inhabitants of the areas that they conquered. 42 In this situation, a highly flexible governable space emerged as a function of the overlapping 43 Networks and connections that were forged in the civil war had become redundant in peace times and with them the specific ideologies and identities attached to them.
The analysis of the south-eastern Sierra Leonean warscape between 1991 and 1996
illustrates the shifting dynamics of governable spaces over longer time periods and how relatively stable governable orders are reshuffled and reconfigured, creating moments and periods of greater instability and uncertainty. The governable space that emerged around the RUF bush camps in the first phase of the war was a fragile equilibrium held together by the relations that the RUF cadres, the camp inhabitants and the forest dwellers had developed. But this governable space disintegrated into a more ambivalent, less predictable and more violent one with the onset of an 'oligopoly of violence' by belligerents plundering and looting the population. 44 These belligerents fashioned highly localized governable spaces of coercion, oppression and expropriation that made life for all warscape inhabitants a risky gamble of survival. Finally, the geography of the Sierra Leone civil war was also shaped by the physical terrain within which warscape inhabitants navigated. The bush as a complex terrain outside of the camps was 16 instrumental for different types of actors, RUF cadres, the CDF, bush inhabitants as a place of refuge, a source of threat and a manoeuvring space in times of instability.
Eastern Sri Lanka, ca. 1999-2002
In Sri Lanka's multi-ethnic east, fifteen years of civil war, inter-ethnic violence, guerrilla tactics and regimes of terror saturated in a political economy of violence and appropriation with multiple co-existing orders and systems of rules towards the end of the 1990s. 45 During this period, before the ceasefire agreement was signed in 2002, Sri
Lanka's east experienced a regime of low-intensity warfare with some territorial pockets held by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), while other territory, mostly the coastal towns and major roads were under control of the government's security forces.
Localized battles and small-scale attacks took place regularly. In this situation, one could broadly distinguish four co-existing governable orders: (1) the remnants of the authority of the state apparatus, (2) the LTTE rule, (3) the rulings of the Sri Lankan security forces (often operating outside formal legal rules), and (4) When performing an action A during daytime, a peasant had to consider what the implications were for his or her life during night time, or the other way round. For example, if the peasant paid taxes to the LTTE during the night, this was a reasonable thing to do under the order of LTTE rule, but it was a dangerous thing under the order of the military's rule during the day. When peasants moved to specific places, the governable space changed as well. When peasants living in an uncleared area under LTTE control wanted to sell their agricultural products, they needed to go to market 18 towns that were located in cleared areas. They passed the frontier line between LTTE rule and military rule, but both rulers interrogated the peasant with suspicion.
In this warscape, farmers, fishermen and local traders developed their own tactics at the interfaces of the different prevailing governable orders. 46 Muslim traders, for example, were able to navigate between the conflict lines. As they were neither Tamil nor Sinhalese, they could deal with both LTTE and Sinhalese army officers. In many places at the Sri Lankan east coast, Muslim traders gradually established a trade monopoly as they bought produce from Tamil farmers and fishermen, which they managed to transport through a large number of military checkpoints to the markets outside of the war zone.
Tamil traders were handicapped in this trade, as they could easily get in trouble at a checkpoint for being suspected as an LTTE spy. But Tamil farmers could also pay back by informing the LTTE on malpractices and unequal market exchanges with Muslim traders who would then be taxed or intimidated by the LTTE at night. 
Conclusion
Watts once wrote that 'violence might be understood as "struggles over geography"' and alluded to 'a geographer's sensitivity to territory, location, to mapping and to the processes of confinement and exclusion'. 53 We have suggested in this article that in order to understand the 'condition of war' and the everyday practices of warscape inhabitants,
an analysis of such struggles over geography is required. The geography of warscape emerges out of the complex interplay of competing systems of authority and power that we have called governable orders. While governable orders are essentially rationales of rule, the ordering of these competing orders -how these different rules are hierarchically ordered and experienced in everyday situations -is malleable in different empirical timespaces, which we have named governable spaces.
The two empirical vignettes that we have taken from Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka A number of authors have suggested that civilian, non-combatant, ordinary, often marginalized actors -subsumed as 'the weak' -dispose of tactic agency in warscapes. 54 We have argued that agency emerges at the ambiguous interface of different governable orders and the territorial and temporal fluidity of governable spaces in warscapes. In other words, an individual's ability to navigate through governable spaces cannot be understood independently of time and place. Ambiguity creates both threats and opportunities, but the implications for navigation may be quite different for an individual 22 in a particular period and location. 55 The examples from Sri Lanka (Muslim traders, Sinhalese farmers) indicate this. What at one point is an opportunity, to make business, to pursue a livelihood, can also become a threat (of extortion, of becoming killed) at another point (place and time).
These struggles and life projects of warscape inhabitants take place; they are strongly embedded in governable spaces of a given time and in a given locality, they relate to, circumvent and reproduce competing governable orders, and they are part of (local and global) social networks that territorialize in the warscape itself. We have argued that it is useful to analyse the geography of warscape as it reveals the dynamics of 'ragged, unstable, perhaps ungovernable, spaces' and indicates the social mechanisms that produce agency, threat and opportunity, stability and instability, security and insecurity in the social condition of war. 56 In this sense, warscapes can be interpreted as struggles over geography. Indeed, as Edward Said wrote, 'just as none of us is outside or beyond geography, none of us is completely free from the struggle over geography.' 57 
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Notes
This article has navigated through turbulent intellectual terrain from its initial ideas to its final 
